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Abstract: 
 
Despite continuing efforts to achieve a major and lasting arms control agreement, the existence 
of large numbers of nuclear weapons is perceived by many as constituting a grave threat to the 
future of the world. This concern is not restricted just to adults: children and adolescents have 
indicated that they, too, fear a nuclear war. In conversations with psychologists and psychiatrists, 
children have revealed stark images of such a war, and have indicated that their plans for the 
future are affected by those fears. Survey research also suggests that significant percentages of 
children and adolescents worry about nuclear war. 
 
Keywords: USSR | Soviet Union | United States | nuclear war | pessimism | optimism 
 
Article: 
 
Despite continuing efforts to achieve a major and lasting arms control agreement, the existence 
of large numbers of nuclear weapons is perceived by many as constituting a grave threat to the 
future of the world. This concern is not restricted just to adults: children and adolescents have 
indicated that they, too, fear a nuclear war. In conversations with psychologists and psychiatrists, 
children have revealed stark images of such a war, and have indicated that their plans for the 
future are affected by those fears. Survey research also suggests that significant percentages of 
children and adolescents worry about nuclear war. 
 
The prospect of our youth growing up suffering from emotional stress, with concomitant 
behavioral problems, is hardly one to give us comfort. On the other hand, casual observation of 
children and adolescents does not provide a picture of traumatized youth; students make plans 
for the future, worry about getting good grades for college entry, plan to marry and have 
children. It is difficult to reconcile these plans with the fact that large numbers of children and 
adolescents surveyed by various researchers in different countries say that they are very worried 
by the threat of nuclear war. We clearly must be cautious before assuming that an expressed fear 
of nuclear war leads to a psychological state of stress or despair or to negative behavioral 
consequences. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the connection between worry about nuclear war and 
attitudes toward the future. In particular, we are interested in knowing whether children and 
adolescents who say that they are worried about nuclear war have a more pessimistic world 
outlook than those who are less worried, and whether the relationship is moderated by their 
knowledge of the consequences of such a war. Furthermore, we wished to know the extent to 
which the relationship varies in two countries (the United States and Soviet Union) and, within 
each country, whether the relationship differs by age and gender. 
 
An interest in the beliefs and attitudes of youth toward nuclear weapons and nuclear war is 
almost as old as the weapons themselves. The first study of adolescent views on this topic was 
conducted in 1947 by Remmers and his colleagues [1]. Only a quarter of their sample of 10,000 
high-school students from across the country did not expect the United States to be at war with 
the Soviet Union within the next five years. 
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, psychologists' concern with adolescents' attitudes toward nuclear war 
has tended to coincide with periods of increasing tension in the world. The Berlin Wall and the 
Cuban missile crisis no doubt played a part in reviving the issue at both a scholarly and an 
emotional level. In 1962 only 17% of a randomly selected sample of 2,000 high-school students 
believed that the chances for peace were greater than even, and 70% felt reasonably sure that an 
attack on the United States would be with nuclear weapons [2]. Interview data obtained in the 
early 1960s from a sample of 10–17-year-olds [3] and information from junior-high and high-
school students [4] revealed similar findings: that 25%~0% of these samples felt that a nuclear 
war was either' 'very possible'' or' 'certain.'' 
 
The depressing images of the future revealed by these adolescents hardly resulted in an increase 
in interest in the questions, at least on the part of the academic community. As Chivian and his 
colleagues put it: ''Awareness of this issue seemed, like the testing of nuclear weapons, to have 
gone underground" [5]. However, the last decade has seen a revival of interest in this topic; and 
it is now difficult to agree with Smith,1 who in 1982 complained about the paucity of hard data 
on this topic, as a large number of studies on adolescent beliefs about nuclear war have since 
been conducted in many countries around the world. 
 
According to the literature, one impression revealed through interviews and analysis of responses 
to questionnaires is that teen-agers are growing up feeling depressed and pessimistic about the 
future. ''Time and time again, in response to questions about nuclear conflict, [adolescents] 
said—and they said it bitterly—that they would pay the biggest price. They would be denied a 
chance to live, to love, to work, to bear children and raise a family" [6]. Austin & Mack [7] have 
made similar points, as have Goodman and her colleagues [8]. Stillion and her co-workers [9], 
reporting the results of a multinational study, found that between a third and a half of the subjects 
                                                          
1 B. Smith (1982) The threat of nuclear war: Psychological impact. Address to the Psychologists for Social 
Responsibility, Eugene, OR. 
in each of six countries said that they were pessimistic when they thought about nuclear war—
although, as the authors pointed out, over half of their sample reported no such pessimistic 
feelings. Lewis and his colleagues [10] reported that approximately a quarter of their random, 
representative, and national sample of almost eight thousand Canadian students from grades 7 to 
12 felt that the nuclear threat was influential in their desire to ''live for today and forget about the 
future,'' and that it was influential in their future marriage and family plans. 
 
These findings are not restricted to adolscents. Newcomb [11], in his sample of 700 19-24-year-
olds, found that anxiety about nuclear war was associated with less purpose in life, more 
depression, and more drug use. Haste [ 12] assumes that "everybody's scared," but that various 
coping mechanisms are used to allow people to cope. 
 
The relationship between expressed worry about nuclear war and attitudes toward the future is 
not clear-cut, however. Diamond & Bachman [13] have found it necessary to differentiate 
between "concern" (which they liken to "worry," but without the affective component implied by 
"worry") and "despair"; they argue that these constructs are not only different but uncorrelated. 
In their data, students who scored high on ''concern'' did not differ from their classmates in terms 
of their level of optimism about the future; but those who scored high on "despair" were far more 
likely than their peers to feel worthless, alienated, and dissatisfied with life. Because these data 
include only high-school seniors, however, it is unclear whether younger adolescents would 
respond in similar fashion. 
 
Deutsch [14], Beardslee & Mack [15], Tizard [16], and others have also pointed out that the 
relationship between an expressed fear of nuclear war and behavioral manifestations of those 
fears is by no means simple; one cannot simply assume a causal connection between them. Thus, 
responding on a questionnaire that one is ''very worried'' about nuclear war, combined with a 
realistic understanding of the likely consequences of such a war, does not necessarily cause 
adolescents to give up on school or decide that there is no point in planning for the future. 
 
A further problem, often noted in the literature [14,17], is that anxiety or concern may be 
artificially stimulated by the mere fact of being asked to fill out a questionnaire that is known to 
be about nuclear war. If the respondents believe, moreover, that the people administering the 
questionnaire are part of an activist group, they may be more inclined to answer in what they 
perceive as the ''expected'' fashion. 
 
Doubt has also been cast on the validity of much of the data collected because many researchers, 
as they themselves acknowledge, have based their findings on accidental or "opportunistic" 
samples that could not be considered to be representative of the adolescent population in the 
community or culture of interest. Self-selected samples are notoriously biased; people who are 
concerned with a particular issue are far more likely to fill in a questionnaire relating to it, thus 
ensuring findings of higher levels of concern than might be experienced by the population in 
general. Similarly, teachers or parents who are concerned about the issue are more likely to 
permit their students or children to respond to a questionnaire. Moreover, if they themselves are 
concerned, they are more likely to have discussed the issue with their children than parents or 
teachers who are less concerned. 
 
These methodological problems have prompted harsh attacks on the validity of the data. Coles 
[17, 18] has concluded that adolescent worry about nuclear war has been vastly overrated in the 
literature, and that it is almost exclusively a phenomenon affecting middle-class children with 
activist parents. A related view is presented in a paper that relies to a surprising degree on ad 
hominem comments to make the point that the worry or anxiety that has been reported is merely 
a combination of biased sampling procedures and "coaching" or "terrorizing" by parents and/or 
other nuclear freeze activists [19). Similarly, London [20] argues that much adolescent concern 
about the issue derives from the baleful influence of teachers involved in the nuclear freeze 
movement. 
 
There are thus two issues to address. The first is the extent to which concern about the prospect 
of nuclear war is restricted to a small (but oversampled) percentage of the adolescent population; 
the second relates to whether adolescents can express a high degree of worry yet indicate that 
they are not overly pessimistic about the future. 
 
It is true that much of the research conducted in the late 1970s and early 1980s was not highly 
sophisticated from a methodological point of view. However, a number of studies have been 
conducted that are good examples of methodological rigor, incorporating large, national, 
representative samples. For example, Bachman and his colleagues, in the Monitoring the Future 
project [13,21], collect yearly data on representative samples of high-school seniors across the 
United States. Their data only peripherally touch on the issue of war, but their findings (collected 
yearly from 1975 to 1984) that between 20% and 35% of seniors indicate that they feel that their 
lives will be cut short by biological or nuclear destruction are not so different from the figures 
reported by opportunistic samples. Solantaus and her colleagues [22], in Finland, and Goldberg 
and her co-workers [10,23], in Canada, have reported very similar findings. 
 
One can assume from these findings that the concerns are not restricted to a small group of 
middle-class adolescents with activist parents, for the samples are representative, and the 
numbers are large. However, Bachman's data [13,21], although both random and representative 
of the entire United States, are generalizable only to seniors. 
 
The research to be reported here may not be generalizable to the whole country, but it is the first 
study of a random sample of American adolescents aged 11 to 18. It is also cross-national in 
scope, being the first study of a random sample of adolescents in the Soviet Union. 
 
Methodology of the present study 
 
Subjects 
 
For logistical and financial reasons, we decided not to attempt a national sample in both 
countries, but rather to sample from regions of each country that might be considered somewhat 
representative. Mary land was chosen as the sampling frame for the United States for a number 
of reasons, the main one being that its highly diverse population, with a mix of rural and urban 
counties, black and white communities, and range of socioeconomic groupings, enabled us to 
sample a wide range of adolescents. Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that these 
results may not be generalizable to the whole United States. However, we included in our 
questionnaire two of the questions that have been included in the national Monitoring the Future 
project [21] in order to compare (at least on these two questions) our data with a national sample. 
Our findings on these questions are very similar to those reported by Diamond & Bachman [13]. 
 
A cluster sampling procedure was followed in which a random sample of counties was first 
selected, the probability of selection being proportional to size. This was followed by a random 
sampling of public junior and senior high schools (private and parochial schools were not 
included) within each county—again, proportional to population. Finally, a random sample of 
classes was chosen within each school to add up to a total of 200 students in each school, divided 
equally among the grades. The sample was selected so as to assure approximately equal numbers 
for each grade from 7 through 12, covering ages 12-18. Of the total of 25 schools selected 
statewide, 20 agreed to participate. The 1986 American sample consisted of 3,332 children, 
1,634 boys (mean age, 14.97; SD, 1.69) and 1,698 girls (mean age, 14.91; SD, 1.71). 
 
The Soviet sample also was not national, but was randomly drawn from two regions (oblasts) 
because, like Maryland, they can be considered somewhat representative of the European portion 
of the Russian Republic. We cannot generalize to the other republics, or to the relatively 
sophisticated centers of Moscow and Leningrad. Like Maryland, these two oblasts have a 
combined population of 4-5 million. The same cluster sampling procedures were followed, the 
sole exception being that at the final level of selection, we randomly selected children from 
classes rather than used the class as the final unit of selection. Forty schools were selected from 
the two oblasts, an average of 50 students being selected from each school. This yielded a 1986 
Russian sample of 2,263 students, 980 boys (mean age, 13.16; SD, 1.49) and 1,283 girls (mean 
age, 13.31; SD, 1.59). 
 
Two further samples were collected, two years later, from the same sites, although not from 
among the same students, in order to ascertain the extent of any changes in beliefs that might 
have occurred that might reflect the improved relations between the two countries between 1986 
and 1988. In 1988, 1,348 Soviet adolescents and 1,735 American adolescents participated. 
 
Methods 
 
The measurement instrument was a questionnaire, the first draft of which was completed in the 
late spring of 1984 by Chivian and Tudge. It was subsequently revised by the present authors 
after pilot testing at several schools in the United States and at two sites in Moscow. In all cases 
in-depth discussions took place with the students following pilot tests of the questionnaire. 
 
The final form of the questionnaire was as follows. Part of the instructions stated: ''This 
questionnaire is part of an international study to learn how young people in several countries 
view themselves, their world, and their future." The first three pages were concerned only with 
demographic information, leisure habits, religious and political affiliation (only for American 
respondents), plans for the future, expectations regarding their children's lives, and open-ended 
questions requesting them to express three wishes, their three greatest fears, and their perceptions 
of the "greatest problems facing the world today." The final section of the first part of the 
questionnaire was taken from one that had been used previously in California [24], England [25], 
and the Soviet Union [5]. It asked students to indicate how worried they were by 19 potentially 
worrying problems, such as getting cancer, not being able to find a satisfying job, and getting 
hooked on drugs. Nuclear war was one of these 19 items, and this was the first time the issue was 
mentioned. 
 
The second part of the questionnaire focused on nuclear weapons and war, on U.S.-Soviet 
relations, and on perceptions that citizens of both countries have of each other. The questions 
were worded so as to ensure that students were not led to answer in any particular way. For 
example, one section began by stating: ''Different people have different beliefs about nuclear 
weapons. Some of these beliefs are found in the statements that follow. What do you believe?'' 
For each statement that could be seen as being biased in one direction, another statement 
provided the opposite point of view. 
 
Questionnaire administration 
 
A researcher from the University of Maryland Survey Research Center administered all the 
questionnaires on site to English and Social Studies classes (as these contained all students from 
the grades of interest) in late April and in October and November of 1986, and again in April and 
May of 1988. The researcher read through the instructions, pointing out that the questionnaire 
was totally anonymous, and said that it was designed to learn how young people viewed 
themselves, their world, and their future. They were encouraged to give their personal opinions 
in response to the questions, and were told that it was not a test. 
 
In the Tambov and Rostov regions of the USSR, the chosen students were taken from their 
classes and placed in a separate room, where the questionnaire was administered, primarily by 
two researchers from the Institute of Sociological Research in Moscow, although in the cities of 
Tambov and Rostov themselves, psychology and education students from the local universities 
undertook this task. One of the authors, Tudge, who speaks Russian, was present during the 
instruction period for those administering the questionnaire in Rostov in 1986. The students were 
instructed by the researchers from the Institute of Sociological Research, both verbally and by 
means of a three-page manual of instructions, which included items such as the importance of 
excluding school personnel from the room while the questionnaire was being administered, the 
fact that anonymity was to be stressed, and so on. Tudge was also present during survey 
administration in schools in both regions in 1986. 
 
The original plan was to administer the questionnaire in both countries simultaneously during 
April 1986. However, the American data collection was begun two weeks after the Soviet data 
were collected—and the Chernobyl accident occurred in the interim. As a result, we decided to 
interrupt the collection of American data and to continue it in the fall, when a new collection of 
Soviet data was made. The procedures described above were those followed by the Soviet data 
collection that took place during the third week of October 1986. The American data were 
gathered from the last week of October through November 1986. The first collection of data 
therefore followed the Reagan-Gorbachev summit at Reykjavik. 
 
Results 
 
The results reported in this paper deal with the extent to which expressed worry about nuclear 
war relates to attitudes toward the future, particularly to a pessimistic view, and whether this 
varies by culture (United States and Soviet Union), gender, and age. Because the 1986 U.S. data 
collection occurred at two times (April-May and October-November 1986) whereas the Soviet 
data collection occurred in October, we shall report only the fall 1986 data. (The bulk of the 
analyses will refer solely to the 1986 samples; the 1988 samples will be discussed only to 
describe the extent, if any, of changes in beliefs that were found to have occurred between 1986 
and 1988.) The 1986 U.S. sample thus consisted of 2,289 children (1,131 boys and 1,150 girls 
[the remainder did not specify gender]), aged 11-19 years (mean age, 15.03), and the 1986 Soviet 
sample consisted of 2,263 children (980 boys and 1,283 girls), aged 10-17 years (mean age, 
13.25).2 
 
In the second wave of data collection, two forms of the questionnaire were used. Approximately 
two-thirds of each sample used a revised form, while one-third used the old form. For purposes 
of comparison, we shall use the data derived solely from students who used the original form—in 
the USSR, 518 (239 boys and 270 girls; mean age, 14.79); and in the USA, 406 (201 boys and 
202 girls; mean age, 15.33). 
 
A number of measures addressed the issue of the extent to which the respondents were 
concerned about nuclear war. As previously noted, the first mention of the topic appeared in a 
list of 19 potentially worrying items to which the students were asked to respond according to a 
4-point scale, ranging from "not at all worried" to "very worried." Another question asked 
explicitly, "Do you think about the likelihood of a nuclear war?' ', to which students could 
respond ''never,'' '' sometimes," or "often." Following Diamond & Bachman [13], we shall refer 
to these two questions as indicating the respondents' degree of ''worry.'' 
 
The students were also asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with the following two 
statements: ''Nuclear or biological annihilation will probably be the fate of all mankind within 
my lifetime'' and ''The human race has been through tough times before and will do so again,'' to 
which they could respond according to a five-point scale from "disagree" to "agree." These two 
items were taken from the Institute for Survey Research Monitoring the Future questionnaire 
[13] and together formed the composite variable Diamond & Bachman termed "nuclear despair." 
As a further measure of despair, we included a question requesting respondents to indicate when, 
if ever, they felt a nuclear war would occur. Those responding that they felt it would occur 
sooner rather than later might be said to be in despair. 
 
Initially we ran analyses of variance (using the SAS general linear models procedure [26]) to 
detect whether or not our sample varied in terms of culture, age, or gender (and in terms of any 
interactions). 
                                                          
2 Analyses were run to determine whether the spring U.S. sample differed significantly from the fall sample on any 
of the variables of interest. We decided that it did not, as the proportion of variance accounted for by time of data 
collection was typically between 0.1 % and 1 % for 16 of the 18 variables of interest. The exceptions were in 
response to questions about the likely fate of the world and about whether the world's greatest problems were 
solvable. In both cases the spring subsample was significantly more pessimistic (regarding the fate of the world—
spring, 3.20; fall, 2.70; F 112.8; P <0.0001; regarding the problems–spring, 2.56; fall, 2.22; F 99.3; P <0.0001). It is 
possible that the Chernobyl accident still weighed on the minds of the spring subsample, but if so it had little or no 
impact on any of the other variables of interest, for virtually no other differences in responses were found. 
Because the Soviet sample consisted primarily of children aged 10-16 years while the American 
sample was composed almost exclusively of children 12-18 years old, we included in these 
analyses only respondents aged 12-16. 
 
With a data set of this size, very small mean differences in scores can yield results that are 
statistically, but not practially, significant. For example, statistical significance can be obtained 
with mean differences in scores of 0.1 on a 5-point scale. For this reason we decided to use 
proportion of the variance explained as a measure of the impact of each of the independent 
variables of interest. The samples did not vary sufficiently by age or by gender to justify their 
inclusion in the model, as the total proportion of the variance accounted for by age, gender, and 
all interaction terms was in no case greater than 3%. The samples were therefore collapsed across 
age and gender—but the data are presented separately for the two cultures of interest. 
 
Adolescents in both countries tended to state that they either were "moderately worried" or "very 
worried" about nuclear war. This is particularly true of the Soviet sample, over 90% of whom 
responded in 1986 that they were "very worried" compared with 54% of their American 
counterparts. In terms of the rank order of the 19 potentially worrying items, the Soviet 
adolescents ranked nuclear war at the top, closely followed by "death of one's parents," whereas 
the American sample reversed this order. As can be seen in Table 1, the mean scores for this item 
were close to the top of the scale, particularly for the Soviet sample. 
 
Table 1. Mean Differences for the Worry and Despair Questions (1986 Data) 
 American sample Soviet sample   
 Mean SD n Mean SD n R2 Fa 
Worry         
Worry 3.11 1.09 2,280 3.89 0.44 2,192 0.18 994.2 
Think 1.97 0.59 2,261 2.12 0.70 2,235 0.01 60.3 
Despair         
When 4.28 1.20 1,676b 5.66 0.84 1,495b 0.30 1,367.1 
Fate 2.69 1.15 2,085 1.88 1.16 2,135 0.11 518.9 
Tough 3.66 1.12 2,141 3.33 1.57 2,125 0.01 61.3 
a All P values <0.0001. 
b Those responding ''don't know'' were dropped from this analysis. 
 
Worry: How worried are you by ... nuclear war? 
Not at all worried (1), a little worried (2), moderately worried (3), very worried (4). 
Think: Do you think about the likelihood of nuclear war? 
Never (1), sometimes (2), often (3). 
When: If a nuclear war happens, when might it take place? 
In the next 5 years (2), in the next 20 years (3), in my lifetime (4), after my lifetime (5), I do not think it will 
ever happen (6), don't know (dropped). 
Fate: Nuclear or biological annihilation will probably be the fate of all mankind within my lifetime. 
Disagree (1), mostly disagree (2), neither (3), mostly agree (4), agree (5). 
Tough times: The human race has come through tough times before and will do so again. 
Disagree (1), mostly disagree (2), neither (3), mostly agree (4), agree (5). 
 
Despite the improvements in relations between the two countries that occurred between 1986 and 
1988, no major differences were detected in rank orderings in 1988, although the degree of 
worry expressed was less. Nuclear war still ranked as the primary source of concern for the 
Soviet sample, but the percentage responding that they were "very worried" was somewhat lower 
than in 1986 (88% compared with 93%). The American sample continued to rank it as the 
second most important source of worry (after death of parents), 46% (compared with 54%) 
responding that they were "very worried." 
 
On the other hand, as can be seen in Table 1, there was little evidence of an expectation that 
nuclear or biological annihilation would be the fate of the world, and many responded that they 
did not expect to see nuclear war occurring during their lifetime. Again, these views were held 
more clearly by the Soviet teen-agers than by the Americans. These results appear to support 
Diamond & Bachman's argument [13] that although adolescents in both countries appear to be 
concerned about nuclear war, they are not in despair. In fact, unlike Diamond & Bachman, who 
found no correlation between the worry and the despair items, we observed (particularly for the 
American sample) a slight tendency for those who indicated that they were more worried to be 
less likely to indicate that they were in despair (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Correlations between Worry and Despair (1986 Data} 
 U.S. sample 
 Worry Despair 
 Worry Think When Fate Tough times 
Worry      
Worry 1.0 0.28 –0.17 0.18  
Think  1.0 –0.15 0.10  
Despair      
When   1.0 –0.27 0.12 
Fate    1.0 –0.16 
Tough times     1.0 
 Soviet sample 
 Worry Despair 
 Worry Think When Fate Tough times 
Worry      
Worry 1.0 **    
Think  1.0 –0.11   
Despair      
When   1.0 –0.16 * 
Fate    1.0 –** 
Tough times     1.0 
Note: Only correlations (Kendall's τ) above 0.10 reported. All are significant at the P <0.0001 level. *P <0.01; **P 
<0.001. For descriptions of the worry and despair items, please see Table 1. 
 
Nevertheless, in 1986 almost 10% of the Soviet teen-agers indicated that they thought that 
nuclear war might occur while they were still alive, and no fewer than 41 % of the Americans 
felt that it could occur during their lifetime—7% of them saying that they expected its 
occurrence within the next 5 years. Similarly, 10% of the Soviet sample and 29% of the 
American sample responded "agree" or "mostly agree" to the statement about the fate of the 
world. Interestingly, while the same percentage of Soviet students responded in 1988 as in 1986, 
only 15% (half as many as in 1986) of the U.S. sample responded that they agreed or mostly 
agreed with this statement. Also, there was a marked decline in the percentage of American 
respondents who believed that nuclear war would occur in their lifetime—33%, down from 
41%—although this is still a far higher percentage than that shown by the Soviet sample (11 % 
in 1988). 
 
Is it the case that these adolescents, who qualify as being ''in despair'' in Diamond & Bachman's 
view, are particularly pessimistic about their future? We included in our questionnaire a number 
of questions relating to optimism/pessimism; two of them came before any mention of nuclear 
war. The first stated: ''In your opinion, if you have children, life for them on our planet will be. . . 
better than for you, the same as for you, worse than for you, don't know." The second followed 
an open-ended question requiring them to indicate what they thought the greatest problems 
facing the world were and asked: "Do you think these problems can be solved?" Several other 
questions relating to optimism were asked after we had first mentioned nuclear war. Some of 
them had to do with the future in general, while others concerned U.S.-Soviet relations. 
 
It may be the case that despair about the nuclear threat is so pervasive that even before the issue 
is brought up in conversation or in the context of a questionnaire, people feel depressed about 
life [14, 17]. Alternatively, it may be that adolescents' responses to questions about nuclear war 
and the future are often pessimistic simply because the issue has just been raised. Because we 
asked the first two questions relating to pessimism before raising the issue of nuclear war, we 
should be able to detect whether or not introducing the issue had any marked impact upon the 
pessimism of our sample's responses. If this were so, we should find the relationship between 
worry and pessimism more marked after raising the issue than before. 
 
Table 3. Mean Levels of Pessimism (1986 Data) 
 American sample Soviet sample   
 Mean SD n Mean SD n R2 Fa 
Pessimism         
Children’s lives 1.56 0.77 1,744b 1.06 0.32 1,727b 0.13 440.2 
Solutions 2.22 0.93 2,243 1.42 0.71 2,222 0.21 949.8 
Future 2.38 0.98 2,252 2.08 1.00 2,097 0.02 90.1 
Prevent war 1.94 1.04 2,185 1.54 0.96 2,145 0.05 192.3 
Cooperation 2.25 1.14 2,180 1.46 0.89 2,161 0.14 582.7 
Relations 2.72 0.94 2,171 2.05 0.91 2,113 0.12 485.8 
a All P values <0.0001. 
b Those responding ''don't know'' were dropped from this analysis. 
 
Before the mention of nuclear war 
Children's lives: In your opinion, if you have children, life for them on our planet will be: Better than for you 
(1), the same as for you (2), worse than for you (3), don't know (dropped). 
Solutions: Do you think [the greatest problems facing the world today] can be solved? 
Definitely yes (1), probably yes (2), not sure (3), probably no (4), definitely no (5). 
 
After the mention of nuclear war 
Future: When you think about the future, do you generally feel: 
Prevent war: Do you think that a nuclear war can be prevented? 
Cooperation: Do you believe that the USA and the USSR can develop cooperation and friendly relations? 
Relations: When you think about the future of United States-Soviet Union relations, do you generally feel: 
 
Responses to "Future" and "Relations": Very optimistic (1), fairly optimistic (2), not sure (3), fairly pessimistic 
(4), very pessimistic (5). 
Responses to "Prevent war" and "Cooperation": Definitely yes (1), probably yes (2), not sure (3), probably no 
(4), definitely no (5). 
 
As can be seen in Table 3, adolescents in both countries did not score high on pessimism in 1986 
and appeared rather optimistic about the future. This was particularly true of the Soviet sample, 
despite so many of these students' indicating that they were very worried about nuclear war. The 
Soviet subjects, on average, responded that they were very optimistic, both about personal issues 
(the questions about their children's lives and about the future) and about the more geopolitical 
issues such as the future of U.S.-Soviet relations. The American students were generally less 
optimistic than their Soviet counterparts, but still displayed a good deal of optimism about the 
future. 
 
Interestingly, the 1988 Soviet adolescents revealed some decrease in optimism: 67% (compared 
with 71% in 1986) responded that life for their children would be better than their own, 61% 
(compared with 67%) believed that the major problems facing the world could "definitely" be 
solved, and only 23% (down from 37% two years earlier) stated that they felt "very optimistic" 
about the future. Similarly, and despite the improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations, the Soviet 
teens were less optimistic about the future of those relations, 26% responding that they were 
''very optimistic'' compared with 34% in 1986. However, 81% believed that cooperation could 
still be developed with the United States (up from 72% in 1986). There was virtually no change 
in the percentage believing that nuclear war could be prevented (69% compared with 68%). 
 
The American students, on the other hand, revealed higher degrees of optimism in 1988 than in 
1986 about improved relations between the two countries, although they were still less optimistic 
than their Soviet counterparts. Thus, 37% (up from 29%) responded that the USA and the USSR 
"definitely" could develop cooperation, and 46% (compared with 43%) "definitely" believed that 
nuclear war could be prevented. However, like the Soviet students, there was a decline in the 
number of Americans who in 1988 thought that their children's lives would be better than their 
own (42% compared with 49%), and only 18% (compared with 20% in 1986) responded that 
they were "very optimistic'' about the future. 
 
Analysis of variance of the 1986 data revealed, as was the case with the worry and despair items, 
that there was no significant variation in our sample according to either age or gender (the total 
amount of variance accounted for by these main effects and the interaction terms was 
consistently less than 2%), but that the mean scores of Soviet teen-agers on these pessimism 
items differed significantly from those of the Americans. We shall therefore present the 
correlations between the measures of worry and pessimism separately for the two cultures. 
 
As Table 4 shows, the pattern of correlations (Kendall's τ) between the items focusing on worry 
about nuclear war and the pessimism items prior to mention of nuclear war is not greatly 
different from the pattern of correlations with the pessimism items that occurred after the issue 
of nuclear war was raised. 
 
Interestingly, the pattern of correlations between the items focusing on despair and on pessimism 
is slightly different, at least for the American sample. The correlations with the despair items 
were slightly greater once the issue of nuclear war was raised, indicating that adolescents who 
seemed to be more in despair were also likely to be more pessimistic. It should be noted, 
however, that these correlations, although quite significant, are not high. In the Soviet case, there 
is no evidence that mention of nuclear war raised levels of either worry or despair. 
 
 
Table 4. Correlations of Worry and Despair with Pessimism (1986 Data) 
 American sample 
 Worry Despair 
 Worry Think When Fate Tough times 
Pessimism      
Children’s lives    *  
Solutions –*    –** 
Future   –* 0.11 –0.13 
Prevent war –** –* –0.12 ** –0.18 
Cooperation –** –** –**  –0.12 
Relations   –* ** –** 
 Soviet sample 
 Worry Despair 
 Worry Think When Fate Tough times 
Pessimism      
Children’s lives –**  –0.15 0.11  
Solutions –*  –0.13 0.13 –** 
Future –**  –** * –* 
Prevent war –* –** –0.17 0.16 –** 
Cooperation  –0.11 –0.16 0.12 –* 
Relations –*  –0.11 0.13 –** 
Note: Only correlations (Kendall's τ) above 0.10 reported. All are significant at the P <0.0001 level. *P <0.01; **P 
<0.001. 
For descriptions of the worry and despair items, please see Table 1; for descriptions of the pessimism items, 
please see Table 3. 
 
It is conceivable, of course, that some of the respondents looked ahead and so, by mistake, 
noticed the mention of nuclear war before we intended. This would certainly have the effect of 
reducing any differences in the pattern of correlations. Nevertheless, to support the thesis that 
raising the issue of nuclear war is likely to artificially raise levels of pessimism, one would need 
evidence of some degree of pessimism; and even after the questionnaire first raised the issue, our 
respondents appeared to be optimistic rather than pessimistic about the future. 
 
These findings appear to indicate that expressed worry about nuclear war is not strongly 
associated with pessimism. Could it be that these adolescents, who appear so optimistic, have an 
unrealistic perception of the likely consequences of an all-out nuclear war? This can be assessed 
by reference to a number of questions relating to the consequences of such a war and to the 
likelihood of their or their families' surviving in the event of war. 
 
Analysis of variance again indicated that the sample did not differ in terms of age and gender; 
however, despite the fact that the Soviet responses often differed significantly from those of the 
American adolescents, the proportion of the variance explained was very low (see Table 5). In 
other words, the mean differences between the two cultures were of statistical, but not practical, 
significance. Adolescents in both countries, no matter what age or gender, seemed to have fairly 
realistic beliefs about the possible consequences of a worldwide nuclear war. However, despite 
the low mean differences between the two cultures, it is still possible that the pattern of 
correlations between consequences and pessimism could be different in our two samples. 
 
 
 
Table 5. Mean Levels of Beliefs about the Likely Consequences of a Nuclear War (1986 Data) 
 American sample Soviet sample   
 Mean SD n Mean SD n R2 F 
Consequences         
You survive 2.79 0.46 2,068a 2.81 0.54 1,535a 0 1.31 (ns) 
Family 2.81 0.44 2,026a 2.79 0.57 1,582a 0 0.92 (ns) 
Winter 2.11 1.02 2,215 1.86 1.20 2,199 0.01 53.8*** 
Survival 3.87 1.00 2,215 4.05 1.07 2,158 0.01 33.2*** 
Shelters 3.43 1.13 2,183 3.58 1.30 2,125 0.001 16.6*** 
No survival 2.50 1.08 2,198 2.22 1.36 2,144 0.01 55.9*** 
No winner 1.92 1.13 2,199 1.79 1.31 2,123 0.002 12.53** 
a Those responding "don't know" were dropped from this analysis. 
••p <0.001; ·••p <0.0001. 
 
You survive: In your opinion, what are your chances of surviving in the event of a worldwide nuclear war? 
Very good (1), 50:50 (2), poor (3), don't know (dropped). 
Family: In your opinion, what are your family's chances of surviving in the event of a worldwide nuclear war? 
Very good (1), 50:50 (2), poor (3), don't know (dropped). 
 
Different people have different beliefs about nuclear weapons. Some of these beliefs are found in the statements that 
follow. What do you believe? 
Winter: After a worldwide nuclear war, the world will be so cold and dark and radioactive that almost no one 
will survive (known as nuclear winter). 
Survival: Although nuclear weapons are very destructive, their effects have been highly exaggerated, and many 
millions will survive a worldwide nuclear war. 
Shelters: The majority of the population can survive a worldwide nuclear war if there are enough fallout 
shelters, food, water, and other supplies. 
No survival: Even in fallout shelters, with enough food and other supplies, almost no one will survive a 
worldwide nuclear war. 
No winner: There can be no winner in a worldwide nuclear war since most countries will be totally destroyed. 
Responses: Definitely yes (1), probably yes (2), not sure (3), probably no (4), definitely no (5). 
 
If optimism about the future were related to a lack of realism about the likely consequences of a 
nuclear war, we should expect those with a more optimistic stance (low scores on the pessimism 
items) to score low on "survival" and "shelters" and high on "winter," "no survival," and "no 
winner" compared with those who were more pessimistic. For neither sample was this borne out 
(see Table 6): in the American sample, only 6 of 30 of the correlations were above 0.1, and most 
were in the opposite direction. The Soviet sample provided even stronger evidence that there was 
no link between optimism (low scores on the pessimism items) and a rosy view of the 
consequences of war: 10 of the 30 correlations were above 0.1 (although none reached 0.2), and 
all were in the opposite direction. This tendency is most apparent if we examine only those 
pessimism items that relate specifically to war and U.S.-Soviet relations ("prevent," 
"cooperation," and "relations"). It is necessary to stress the fact that correlations in the 0.10-0.20 
range are not particularly compelling as evidence of a tight link among the variables. 
Nevertheless, there appears to be no correspondence between an optimistic viewpoint and 
unrealistic perceptions of the likely consequences of a nuclear war. 
 
Similarly, there appears to be very little evidence that those who worried more about the 
prospects of a nuclear war or who might be said to be in despair about it differed much in terms 
of their understanding of the likely consequences of such a war from their counterparts who 
worried less (see Table 7). There was, however, a tendency for those adolescents in both 
countries who thought that a nuclear war was unlikely to occur (high scores on "when") to agree 
with statements that a nuclear war would not be survivable (low scores on ''winter," "no 
survival," and "no winner") and to disagree with the obverse opinion (low scores on "survival" 
and "shelters"). 
 
Table 6. Correlations of Pessimism and Beliefs about Consequences (1986 Data) 
 American sample 
 Pessimism items 
 Children’s lives Solution Future Prevent war Cooperation Relations 
Consequences       
You survive 0.13   –** –**  
Family 0.11   –*   
Winter    0.10 0.10  
Survival *   –**   
Shelters 0.10      
No survival –*   0.12 **  
No winner  ** * 0.19 0.15  
 Soviet sample 
 Pessimism items 
 Children’s lives Solution Future Prevent war Cooperation Relations 
Consequences       
You survive       
Family –0.12   –** –**  
Winter  -  0.15 0.14 ** 
Survival –** –** –** –0.15 –0.14 –0.11 
Shelters    –0.15 –0.15 –** 
No survival   ** ** ** ** 
No winner  * * 0.18 0.17 0.12 
Note: Only correlations (Kendall's τ) above 0.10 reported. All are significant at the P <0.0001 level. *P <0.01; **P 
<0.001. 
For description of the pessimism items, please see Table 3; for description of the consequences items, please see 
Table 5. 
 
It may be the case that these low correlations are simply a result of the fact that adolescent 
opinion is not at all stable; one would also find very low correlations among variables if these 
teen-agers were responding more or less randomly. This would be in line with other research in 
the area of political socialization that has found not only low correlations between adolescents 
and their parents and teachers and views expressed in the media [27-29] but little stability over 
time in adolescent responses [30]. To the extent to which the issues are relatively remote from 
their day-to-day lives, as Coles [17] has argued, this lack of coherence may be understandable. 
 
Nevertheless, although the correlations were not high (typically they did not rise above 0.3), 
Tables 8 (for the pessimism questions) and 9 (for the consequences questions) show clearly that 
there was some stability of intercorrelations within classes of items—that is, respondents who 
scored high on one of the pessimism questions were reasonably likely to score high on another. 
The lack of correlations among classes (i.e., between worry about nuclear war and views of the 
consequences) is thus unlikely to be simply the result of a lack of coherence or stability in the 
respondents' views. 
 
 
Table 7. Correlations of Worry and Despair with Consequences (1986 Data) 
 American sample 
 Worry Despair 
 Worry Think When Fate Tough times 
Consequences      
You survive  –**    
Family  *    
Winter –** –**  –**  
Survival ** 0.11    
Shelters –* *  –** –* 
No survival –* –**    
No winner  –0.13    
 Soviet sample 
 Worry Despair 
 Worry Think When Fate Tough times 
Consequences      
You survive  **    
Family  0.14    
Winter  –0.12  **  
Survival  ** * –0.11 ** 
Shelters  0.11  –**  
No survival  –**    
No winner  –**  **  
Note: Only correlations (Kendall's τ) above 0.10 reported. All are significant at the P < 0.0001 level. *P < 0.01; **P 
< 0.001. 
For descriptions of worry and despair items, please see Table 1; for descriptions of the consequences items, 
please see Table 5. 
 
Table 8.  
 American sample 
 Pessimism items 
 Children’s lives Solution Future Prevent war Cooperation Relations 
Pessimism       
Children’s lives 1.0 ** **  * ** 
Solutions  1.0 0.10 0.23 0.21 0.12 
Future   1.0 0.11 0.11 0.21 
Prevent war    1.0 0.45 0.15 
Cooperation     1.0 0.26 
Relations      1.0 
 Soviet sample 
 Pessimism items 
 Children’s lives Solution Future Prevent war Cooperation Relations 
Pessimism       
Children’s lives 1.0 0.12 * 0.12 0.10 ** 
Solutions  1.0 0.19 0.24 0.22 0.20 
Future   1.0 0.14 0.12 0.31 
Prevent war    1.0 0.50 0.20 
Cooperation     1.0 0.23 
Relations      1.0 
Note: Only correlations (Kendall's τ) above 0.10 reported. All are significant at the P < 0.0001 level. *P < 0.01; **P 
< 0.001. 
For description of the pessimism items, please see Table 3. 
 
 
Table 9. Correlations of Questions about Likely Consequences of Nuclear War 
 American sample 
 Consequences 
 Con1 Con2 Con3 Con4 Con5 Con6 Con7 
Consequences        
You survive (Con1) 1.0 0.77 –0.21 0.22 0.19 –0.16 –0.18 
Family (Con2)  1.0 –0.21 0.19 0.21 –0.13 –0.16 
Winter (Con3)   1.0 –0.28 –0.14 0.27 0.26 
Survival (Con4)    1.0 0.24 –0.22 –0.21 
Shelters (Con5)     1.0 –0.31 –0.18 
No survival (Con6)      1.0 0.27 
No winner (Con7)       1.0 
 Soviet sample 
 Consequences 
 Con1 Con2 Con3 Con4 Con5 Con6 Con7 
Consequences        
You survive (Con1) 1.0 0.77 –0.12 0.12 ** –* –0.10 
Family (Con2)  1.0 –0.15 0.18 0.12 –** –0.15 
Winter (Con3)   1.0 –0.25 –0.15 0.16 0.22 
Survival (Con4)    1.0 0.37 –0.18 –0.22 
Shelters (Con5)     1.0 –0.26 –0.17 
No survival (Con6)      1.0 0.38 
No winner (Con7)       1.0 
Note: Only correlations (Kendall's 't) above 0.10 reported. All are significant at the P < 0.0001 level. *P < 0.01; **P 
< 0.001. 
For description of the consequences items, please see Table 5. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Our samples of adolescents in the state of Maryland in the United States and in the regions of 
Tambov and Rostov in the Soviet Union indicated that they were very worried about nuclear 
war. When asked, before any mention of war, to respond in 1986 to an open-ended question 
about their "three wishes" and "three greatest fears," 23.2% of the American sample placed 
''peace'' or ''no war'' among their wishes, and 31.7% said that ''war'' or ''nuclear war'' was among 
their "greatest fears" (the Soviet sample has yet to be analyzed). Similarly, when presented with 
19 potentially worrying items, 54% of the American sample and no fewer than 93% of the Soviet 
sample responded in 1986 that they were "very worried" about nuclear war. The percentages 
were somewhat reduced, but still very high, in 1988—46% of the U.S. sample and 88% of the 
Soviet sample responded that they were "very worried." However, as we have reported elsewhere 
[31], the Soviet respondents expressed a greater degree of worry about all items except not being 
able to find a satisfying job (in 1986 and 1988) and getting cancer (only in 1988). This was true 
for items such as "being the victim of a violent crime" or "getting hooked on drugs," despite the 
fact that there is no reason to believe that the regions of Tambov and Rostov are more crime- or 
drug-ridden than Maryland—in fact, the reverse is more likely to be the case. 
 
There was also some tendency for our respondents to generalize their worry. The pattern of 
correlations of worry about nuclear war with the remaining 18 potentially worrying items 
revealed, for the 1986 American sample, correlations ranging typically from 0.21 to 0.37 (with 
"being considered physically unattractive," "people not liking me," and "not being able to find a 
satisfactory job" correlating less and the correlation between "nuclear power plant accident" and 
"nuclear war" being the highest, at 0.52). The correlations were typically lower for the Soviet 
sample, all ranging from 0.10 to 0.29 (the highest being with a power plant accident). This 
pattern of correlations indicates that those who worried more about nuclear war were somewhat 
more likely to show higher degrees of worry about other items. 
 
Because of the intercorrelation of the worry items and the greater tendency for the Soviet 
adolescents to express worry, it was necessary to examine the rank ordering of worries rather 
than the simple means. Four of the top five worries of the Soviet sample in 1986 were issues of 
global concern—world hunger, nuclear power plant accident, and environmental pollution, in 
addition to nuclear war (the exception being "death of parents," ranked number 2), whereas four 
of the top five American concerns were personal issues (''nuclear war,'' ranked number 2, being 
the exception). The same pattern was evident in terms of the American responses to open-ended 
questions about wishes for the future and greatest fears. (Interestingly, the 1988 Soviet sample 
included the same concerns in their top five, whereas concern about world hunger was included 
among the top U.S. worries in 1988.) 
 
Unlike the assumptions made by some researchers, we found little evidence of any correlation 
between worry and pessimism about the future in either culture of interest. In fact, the pattern of 
correlations in both the Soviet and the American samples revealed that those who responded that 
they were most worried were slightly more likely to indicate that they were optimistic, not 
pessimistic, about the future. In common with the findings reported by Diamond & Bachman 
[13], we found some evidence for a relation between despair and pessimism in that adolescents 
who scored higher in terms of despair (they were more likely to believe that a nuclear war was 
likely to occur and to agree with the statement that biological or nuclear annihilation was the 
likely fate of the world, and less likely to agree that the human race had come through tough 
times before and would do so again) were more likely to indicate that they were pessimistic 
about the future. This should not come as any great surprise, of course: to be in despair about the 
future is, almost by definition, a pessimistic state of mind. 
 
As reported by Diamond & Bachman, there was no evidence that those who scored high on the 
worry questions scored high on despair. In fact, the reverse tendency was noted; particularly in 
the American sample, those who indicated higher levels of worry seemed to be less in despair. 
Especially noticeable, in fact, is that so few of our respondents expressed pessimistic views about 
the future or seemed to be in despair. Clearly, this has nothing to do with unrealistic notions of 
the likely consequences of a worldwide nuclear war, for the adolescents in both countries 
appeared knowledgeable on this score. Also striking is the fact that only 9% of the 1986 Soviet 
sample believed that a nuclear war would occur during their lifetime (11 % in 1988); 56% of the 
1986 sample indicated that they did not believe it would ever happen (compared with 49% in 
1988). By contrast, only 13% of the 1986 American sample believed that such a war would never 
occur (17% of the 1988 sample), and no fewer than 41 % (33% in 1988) indicated that they 
believed it might occur during their lifetime. We thus have the seemingly paradoxical finding 
that the Soviet adolescents expressed more worry about nuclear war than their American 
counterparts, but seemed more sure that it would not occur. 
 
As we have discussed elsewhere [32], cross-cultural data, particularly those deriving from 
questionnaires, do not lend themslves to easy interpretation. Careful translation of the 
questionnaire items does not eliminate the problem of subtle differences in meaning. For 
example, if in one society, but not the other, adolescents believe that it is "not cool'' to admit to 
being worried, the same degree of concern might be expressed very differently. Without the 
benefit of in-depth interviews with representative samples of youth in the two countries, it is 
difficult to provide much more than speculation about the reasons for the differences in degree of 
optimism expressed, or why the Soviet adolescents indicated higher degrees of worry about 
nuclear war. 
 
One possible explanation, however, is that although Soviet youths are encouraged to consider 
matters of global concern, the future has, until recently, almost uniformly been presented in 
schools and the mass media as generally bright and filled with promise. This was particularly 
true in the years before Gorbachev's accession to power and the advent of glasnost', when the 
present could be described as problematic, but when great improvements were anticipated in the 
near future. This is no longer the case, and the Soviet media now paint as bad a picture of Soviet 
contemporary life and prospects for the immediate future as anything likely to be seen in the 
American press. There may now be much less of a contrast with the U.S. media, which generally 
seem preoccupied with bad news and crises that appear to have few, if any, solutions. 
 
A further factor that might account for the different levels of optimism in the two countries has 
to do with the way in which the nuclear threat has been portrayed in the Soviet media. On 
television and radio and in the press, a good deal of time and space has been devoted to the issue. 
The view has been that if there were a nuclear war, it would almost certainly become a global 
conflict and that life as we know it would end. But because that is the likely consequence, the 
Soviet people are repeatedly told that their country, which suffered so greatly in World War II, 
will do everything possible to prevent another war. Furthermore,' 'people of goodwill'' in other 
countries, as well as the Soviet population, young and old, are actively involved in the "struggle 
for peace.'' Vast numbers of Soviet children and adolescents are engaged in this ''struggle,'' 
designing posters, sending letters to world leaders, and generally making their opinions known. 
Although these activities may not have a direct impact on the current international situation, they 
may have beneficial psychological effects in serving to make children more optimistic about the 
future. 
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